Suchergebnisse

What happens to cabinet governance if parties do not act as 'unitary actors'? In this paper, I examine the consequences of intra-party dissent for coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Drawing on the principal–agent literature, I develop a model in which party agents, namely cabinet ministers and legislators rather than parties as collective actors, decide on specific policies. The individuals' amount of loyalty determines the degree of party unity. I use simulation techniques to analyze the power of an agenda-setting minister in a two-party coalition conditional on the level of party unity. The results suggest that the minister's agenda-setting power diminishes if parliamentarians and cabinet members aim at implementing their personal policy preferences. However, the party not in charge of the respective portfolio may benefit from disunity within its own ranks. This counter-intuitive result raises doubts about the widespread view that internal unity strengthens the bargaining power of political parties.

What happens to cabinet governance if parties do not act as 'unitary actors'? In this paper, I examine the consequences of intra-party dissent for coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Drawing on the principal-agent literature, I develop a model in which party agents, namely cabinet ministers and legislators rather than parties as collective actors, decide on specific policies. The individuals' amount of loyalty determines the degree of party unity. I use simulation techniques to analyze the power of an agenda-setting minister in a two-party coalition conditional on the level of party unity. The results suggest that the minister's agenda-setting power diminishes if parliamentarians and cabinet members aim at implementing their personal policy preferences. However, the party not in charge of the respective portfolio may benefit from disunity within its own ranks. This counter-intuitive result raises doubts about the widespread view that internal unity strengthens the bargaining power of political parties. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

AbstractPolitical debates are structured by underlying conflict dimensions, such as left-right and economic and cultural ideology, which form the basis for voter choice and party competition. However, we know little about how voters arrive at perceptions of parties' positions on these dimensions. We examine how the emphasis parties place on the different issues that make up a higher-level ideological dimension affects perceptions of their position on that dimension. Using two population-based survey experiments, we present respondents with either short or long statements that communicate the same issue stances. We then test whether the length of statements affects positional perceptions on the higher-level dimension. The empirical results show support for our hypotheses and imply that political parties – and the context in which they compete – can affect their perceived position even if underlying issue stances remain stable.

We ask whether and why European political parties receive election news coverage abroad and investigate this phenomenon by combining theoretical stipulations regarding the politicisation of European integration and the horizontal Europeanisation of national public spheres. Based on a content analysis of 64 newspapers in 16 European Union countries following the 2019 European Parliament election, we argue that contestation over European integration increases the likelihood that foreign journalists report election results from a particular member state. Eurosceptic parties are more often visible abroad than Europhile parties, unless they stood for election in a highly polarised party system. Our results have important implications for the European Union's legitimacy as contestation over European integration increases the chances for citizens to learn about election results in other European countries.

Studies on political communication in multiparty democracies usually focus on political parties as unitary actors and how they engage with each other in election campaigns. We deviate from this approach and study how issue engagement (i.e., the degree to which party actors address the same issues) varies across members of parliament. We argue that MPs' role in parliament affects how they engage with other legislators. In particular, we expect an intraparty division of labor, where each party's policy specialists address the same issues. Moreover, party front benchers have a distinct way of communicating: they are more likely to engage with other party leaders rather than with policy specialists of rival parties. Using spatial lag models based on approximately 15,000 press releases by Austrian MPs, we find empirical support for these expectations. Our findings show the limitations of the "unitary actor" approach for studying issue engagement in European party systems.

Studies on political communication in multiparty democracies usually focus on political parties as unitary actors and how they engage with each other in election campaigns. We deviate from this approach and study how issue engagement (i.e., the degree to which party actors address the same issues) varies across members of parliament. We argue that MPs' role in parliament affects how they engage with other legislators. In particular, we expect an intraparty division of labor, where each party's policy specialists address the same issues. Moreover, party front benchers have a distinct way of communicating: they are more likely to engage with other party leaders rather than with policy specialists of rival parties. Using spatial lag models based on approximately 15,000 press releases by Austrian MPs, we find empirical support for these expectations. Our findings show the limitations of the "unitary actor" approach for studying issue engagement in European party systems. ; Peer Reviewed

The left-right dimension is widely used by voters and parties as a 'super-issue' with flexible, varying meaning. Hence, it is important to know how voters place parties on the left-right dimension. We argue that voters infer left-right party positions from their positions on two key ideological subdimensions: economic and cultural issues. However, a subdimension should influence party placements on the left-right dimension more if the subdimension is important (1) to the party and (2) in the party system as a whole. In aggregate-level models using voter data from the 2014 European Election Study and party data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we show that perceived left-right position of a party reflects in particular party positions on issue dimensions that are (1) more important to the party and (2) more salient in the party system. This finding provides insight into the sources of voter perceptions and has wider implications for our understanding of party competition, as we show how parties' salience strategies can have consequences for position-based ideological perceptions and voting decisions.

Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

Position change is an essential feature of political competition. Implicitly, policy change on an issue dimension is often equated with opinion change on specific issues within that dimension. However, in addition to opinion-based policy change, we highlight that parties and candidates can change their overall position by increasing their emphasis on certain opinions within that issue dimension (emphasis-based policy change). Using party manifesto data, we find that parties differ in their use of each type of policy change based on aspects of party organization, particularly the relative power of leaders and activists. Leader-dominated parties are more likely to engage in opinion-based policy change, also in reaction to systemic policy shifts. In contrast, activist-dominated parties tend to change their overall position in reaction to systemic shifts by emphasizing certain positions more. Our approach links salience-based to spatial models of party competition and has broader implications for how we study party competition.

The emergence of the radical right as a strong competitor to mainstream parties has fundamentally reshaped patterns of competition in many European party systems. In this article, we systematically explore changes to the ideological landscape in Western Europe by examining whether there has been programmatic mainstreaming of radical right parties due to (a) accommodation to and (b) moderation by radical right parties. We examine positions and salience on liberal-authoritarianism and the salience of economic issues using manifesto data from 68 parties in 17 countries. Our findings provide empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems: on liberal-authoritarianism, mainstream left and right parties have increased their emphasis and moved to the right. Yet radical right parties have generally remained niche competitors; they are increasingly extreme and more focused on liberal-authoritarianism. Our analysis has important implications for understanding party systems, party competition and citizen representation in Europe.